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Normative Creativity and Global Legal Pluralism:
Reflections on the Democratic Critique of
Transnational Law
OREN PEREZ'
The globalization process has changed the nature of the "social." Social in-
teractions have become much more varied and flexible-transgressing tradi-
tional political and cultural boundaries (and expectations). The emergence of
new forms of global law, which evolve and operate across these traditional lines,
is a major aspect of globalization.' This expanding network of transnational "le-
galities" is not based on a coherent set of normative or institutional hierarchies.
Rather, it represents a highly pluralistic mixture of legal regimes, with variable
organizational and thematic structures: from state-oriented systems-such as
the dispute settlement system of the WTO, or the adjudicative system of the
Law of the Sea Convention-to hybrid2 or private regimes. The latter category
includes, for example, the expanding field of technical standardization, 3 the new
governance structure of the Internet,4 and the field of transnational arbitration.5
* Faculty of Law, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel. In preparing this article I benefited
from the comments of the participants at the Conference on Social Movements and New Social
Communities: North/South Globalization, New York University, April 20-22, 2001, in which an
earlier version of this article was delivered. I am grateful to the Florence Unger and Samuel Gold-
stein, M.D., Interdisciplinary Center for Law, Rationality, Ethics and Social Justice for financial
support.
1. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, 'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW
WITHOUT A STATE3-28 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997); see also Andrew Linklater, The Evolving Spheres of In-
ternational Justice, 75 INT'L AFF. 473 (1999); Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration:
Fragmented States and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1014 (1996).
2. The term "hybrid" refers to the tight cooperation between public and private bodies in cer-
tain regimes.
3. Technical standardization is led and dominated by a variety of transnational organizations
such as the International Organization for Standardization, the International Electrotechnical
Commission and the Codex Alimentarius Commission.
4. A key player in this new field ofgovernance is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN). One of the more prominent achievements in this field was the establish-
ment of an international system for the resolution of domain name controversies. The system was
developed jointly by ICANN and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
5. Transnational arbitration is dominated by international legal firms (mainly American and
European) and business associations such as the International Chamber of Commerce and its In-
ternational Court of Arbitration.
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The globality of these systems stems from their (parallel) claim for universal va-
lidity, and from the cosmopolitan nature of their thematic horizon (which
means that their normative effort is directed primarily at global issues).6
Many of these new global legal structures have evolved in response to the
needs of the global economy, with its adamant push for a system free of regula-
tory barriers. The normative outlook of these systems, however, is not limited to
the economic domain. It has significant spill-overs, with wide-ranging social im-
plications, from environmental to cultural. The influence of these systems over
the life of the global citizenry has increased substantially over the last decade.
The WTO legal system, for example, has addressed disputes involving difficult
environmental dilemmas-from the risks associated with the use of synthetic
growth hormones in cattle, to the damage caused to sea turtles by shrimp trawl-
ing, to the risks associated with the industrial use of asbestos.7 International stan-
dards-setting organizations, such as the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) and the Codex Alimentarius Commission, have been
involved in the production of controversial standards, such as the ISO environ-
mental management standards (the ISO 14000 series) and the Codex Commis-
sion's evolving standards on foods derived from biotechnology.'
The affinity of these global legal structures to economic interests has ad-
versely influenced their sensitivity to "civic" concerns and has been subject to ex-
tensive criticism in both grass-root and academic circles.9 The recent protests
6. See, e.g., Teubner, supra note 1.
7. See Appellate Body Report, EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
Jan. 16, 1998, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R [hereinafter Hormones Case]; Appellate Body
Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Oct. 12, 1998,
WT/DS58/AB/R [hereinafter Shrimp Report]; Appellate Body Report, EC-Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, Mar. 12, 2001, WT/DS 135/AB/R [hereinafter EC-Asbes-
tos]. The rulings of the WTO tribunals are available at the WTO disputes settlement gateway:
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu e/ dispu-e.htm.
8. The ISO 14000 series is a wide-ranging collection of international, voluntary environmental
standards deal with a variety of corporate management issues. For a more detailed discussion, see
infra Part 1. The Codex Commission is currently trying to develop general principles for risk anal-
ysis of foods derived from biotechnology. See, for further details, the Codex Commission Website:
http:// www.codexalimentarius.net. The Codex Commission was also involved in other contro-
versial issues such as the risks of administering growth hormones to cattle.
9. See Globalising Poverty, ECOLOGIST REP., Sept. 2000, at 6 (critiquing the Bretton Woods insti-
tutions) [hereinafter Globalising Povertyl; see also Patti Goldman & Martin Wagner, Trading Away
Public Health: WTO Obstacles to Effective Toxic Controls, 20 MULTINATIONAL MONITOR (1999),
available at http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm 1999/mm9910.08.htm. For an analysis of the
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against globalization-from Seattle 1998 to Quebec and Gothenburg 2001-
were driven by a deep skepticism of the legitimacy of these a-national legal
structures, and a conviction that their decision-making procedures should un-
dergo deep reform."0 What emerges from these protests is a profound aspiration
for a "voice"-for greater civic involvement in these global processes of norm
production. The critique of this evolving network of legal governance has been
fierce. Thus it was argued, for example, that the alliance between the three Bret-
ton Woods institutions (the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF)" and the Mul-
tinational Enterprises community is imposing upon the global society a new
form of "faceless" tyranny, 2 which is driven by uncontrollable and (socially) in-
attentive economic rationality, and is governed by a dubious regime of "unac-
countable 'experts' adjudicating behind closed doors."13
This demand for a voice presents the global community with a difficult di-
lemma. While it is hard to question the urgency and genuineness of this aspira-
tion, casting the demand for a voice in a coherent theoretical or pragmatic form
controversy surrounding the work of the ISO and the Codex Commission, see Paula C. Murray,
Inching Toward Environmental Regulatory Reform-ISO 14000: Much Ado About Nothing Or a Re-
invention Tool?, 37 AM. Bus. L. J., 35 (1999). Seealso George Gaskell et al., WorldApart? The Recep-
tion of Genetically Modified Foods in Europe and the U.S., 285 SCIENCE 384 (1999).
10. The failure of the WTO Conference at Seattle was celebrated as a victory of grass-roots de-
mocracy over the undemocratic rule of the WTO and the multinational corporations. See, e.g.,
Vandana Shiva, This Round to the Citizens, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 8, 1999, available at http'/
www.guardian.co.uk/print/ 0,3858,3939018,00.html; Barry Coates, Friends Fall Out, THE GUARD-
IAN, Dec. 8, 1999, available at http:// www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,3939015,00.html.
11. See Globalising Poverty, supra note 9, at 6-7 (reviewing various recent critiques of the Bretton
Woods system).
12. See Andrew Marr, The Seattle Debacle Has Raised Crucial Questions About the Role of the
World Trade Organisation, THE OBSERVER, Dec. 5, 1999, at 28.
13. FRIENDS-OF-THE-EARTH, FooLs' GOLD-THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
AND THE THREAT OF UNSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 5 (1992) (criticizing the new dispute settlement
mechanism of the WTO, which was set by the "Understanding on Rules and Procedures Govern-
ing the Settlement of Disputes," Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement); see also Third World Net-
work, Statement from Members of International Civil Society Opposing a Millennium Round or
a New Round of Comprehensive Trade Negotiations, at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/wtomr-
cn.htm (last updated Aug. 4, 1999) (the Statement was signed by several hundred NGOs before
the 1999 WTO third ministerial conference); A Ten-Point Plan to Fight for the Americas: No to
FTAA, at http://www.citizen.org/trade/ftaa/articles.cfm?id=8483 (last visited Feb. 27, 2003) (crit-
icizing the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in a similar fashion for "setting up
dispute resolution processes which refer disagreements to secret international trade tribunals
above and outside of national judiciaries which allow foreign governments and corporations to
bypass a nation's courts and legal system").
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remains a difficult task. Two questions seem to lie at the heart of this difficulty.
First, what does the notion of "legitimacy" mean in the transnational context?
Second, in what sense does the call for "democratization" solve the problem of
"legitimacy"? These difficulties point to the deep problem of the association be-
tween legitimacy and democracy at the transnational level.
This article seeks to confront this problem by taking a closer look into this
coupling. In its first part (sections I to II) the article reviews some of the more
prominent responses to the challenge of transnational legitimacy: from the
Westphalian-inspired concept of "indirect democratic supervision," to the more
universalistic ideas of "NGOs-led democratization" and "directly deliberative
democracy." This article argues that none of these narratives provides a convinc-
ing response to the democracy/legitimacy puzzle. In its second part (sections IV
and V), the article develops an alternative interpretation to the problem of legit-
imacy (and its resolution), drawing on the ideas of "normative creativity" and
"social pluralism."
Before proceeding with the argument, it is important to take a closer look at
the idea of "legitimate law" (or "authority").4 One possible approach to this con-
cept views the question of legitimacy from a functional or substantial perspec-
tive: to the extent that a transnational norm promotes the common good, it
should be seen as legitimate. From this perspective, the process leading to the
adoption of a certain norm is not relevant to the question of its legitimacy. Under
this account, democracy has no role in the creation of legitimacy: the question is
rather which set of criteria constitutes the best expression of the common good.
There are numerous answers to this question-from economics to science and
religion-each with its own community of experts. The declining trust in ex-
perts and professional expertise, however, has eroded significantly the power of
14. See Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Between Centralization and Fragmentation:
The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, John F
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Working Paper No. RWP01-004, 2001
(showing that the notion of legitimacy has been subject to various interpretations); see also Daniel
M. Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International
Environmental Law?, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 596,596-624 (1999) (arguing that legitimacy "concerns the
justification of authority; it provides grounds for deferring to another's decision, even in the ab-
sence of coercion or rational persuasion" and that theories of legitimacy "attempt to specify what
factors might serve as justifications."); J.H.H. Weiler, Does Europe Needa Constitution? Reflections
on Demos, Telos, and Ethos in the German Maastricht Decision, in THE QUESTION OF EUROPE 265,
265-94 (Peter Gowan & Perry Anderson eds., 1997).
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expert knowledge to provide privileged accounts of the common good and,
hence, to serve as a source and arbiter of legitimacy."5
The broadening acceptance of the democratic ideal in contemporary (glo-
bal) society means that the legitimacy of transnational regimes is judged, in-
creasingly, by the nature of the process that led to the regimes' creation, and by
the public accountability of those who implement them. 6 This tendency reflects
a widely-shared expectation that the people affected by a certain normative
structure should be involved in its design and implementation. Legitimacy is
seen as a measure of consent and control. The continuing protests against "glo-
balization," then, seem to be motivated by a feeling that the current political map
does not provide an adequate response to this widely-shared expectation. This
political failure is twofold. On one hand, despite all the talk about globalization,
we still lack the necessary institutional mechanisms that could enable a world-
wide democratic experience. There is no global political center from which the
legitimacy of transnational norms (and the systems that produce them) could be
derived. On the other hand, the institutions of the "nation-state"-which still
operates as the main locus for political action--offer no real solution to this glo-
bal deficiency (in contrast to what is postulated by the Westphalian paradigm). 17
The increasing dissatisfaction with the traditional mechanisms of legitimiza-
tion (from professional expertise to the institutions of the nation-state) points,
then, to the importance of developing alternative accounts of legitimacy. This
challenge is taken here. The article is organized as follows. Part I examines in
more detail the structure of one of the new domains of transnational law-that of
technical standardization. It looks, in particular, into the role of one key player: the
ISO. This short case study explores two questions that underlie the broader
15. See Brian Wynne, May The Sheep Safely Graze? A Reflexive View of the Expert Lay Knowledge
Divide, in RISK, ENVIRONMENT AND MODERNITY 44 (Scott Lash et al. eds., 1996) (showing the fate of
the atomic and bio-science industries as a recent example of this phenomenon and discussing the
decline of the "expert-rule").
16. The decline of"expertism" has not been absolute. There are still many occasions on which
the legitimacy of legal regimes is judged, mainly according to particular substantial criteria, as ex-
pressed in the opinions of the relevant expert community. The case of the Climate Change Con-
vention and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is a good example. See infra notes
51-58.
17. For more extensive critique of the Westphalian paradigm, see Teubner, supra note 1, at 3-30;
see also Paul Wapner, Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, 47
WORLD POL. 311 (1995); Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV.
167 (1999); infra Part II.
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concerns of this article. First, to what extent does this new normative domain raise
issues of public concern? How critical is the encroachment of the ISO into the
civic domain? Second, to what extent does the decisionmaking structure of the
ISO provide opportunities for public participation? Part II provides a more de-
tailed critique of the Westphalian narrative and its legitimization argument (the
notion of "indirect democratic supervision") and argues that this narrative fails to
provide an adequate response to the challenge of legitimacy.
Part III considers the more universalistic approaches of"NGO-led democ-
ratization" and "directly deliberative democracy". While these two responses
offer a challenge to the state-centered logic of the Westphalian model, both
remain unconvincing in their attempt to resolve the legitimacy/democracy
puzzle. Part IV looks more closely at the theoretical underpinnings of the idea of
"directly deliberative democracy". It argues that none of the possible pathways
that lead from democracy-in its directly deliberative interpretation-to legiti-
macy are convincing. The fragility of the legitimacy/democracy connection
points, then, to the need for an alternative understanding of legitimacy, for an-
other standpoint from which to observe the current calls for the democratization
of transnational law. The section concludes by putting forward such an alterna-
tive viewpoint, drawing on the idea of "creative norm-making" or "creative
institution."
I. AN ILLUSTRATIVE STUDY: THE CASE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION
This section examines the story of a particular system of transnational law: the
field of technical standardization. The International Organization for Standardiza-
tion (ISO), together with the International Electrotechnical Commission and the
Codex Alimentarius Commission, play a major role in the process of norm produc-
tion in this field. This section takes a closer look at the ISO. The discussion in this
section is guided by two key questions. First, to what extent has the ISO encroached
onto the civic domain, and should the public care about the work of the ISO? Sec-
ond, does the public have any say in the standard-setting process within the ISO?
The ISO, unlike, for example, the World Trade Organization (WTO), is pre-
dominantly a private body. It is a worldwide federation of national standardization
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bodies from some 140 countries (one from each country)."8 The work of the ISO
covers all technical fields except electronic engineering and telecommunication. 9
The establishment of the WTO in 1995 transformed the normative status of ISO
standards. The drafters of the WTO sought to confront the trade barriers caused by
the existence of multiple technical and sanitary standards across the globe by giving
a boost to the process of standards harmonization. The main vehicles for this effort
were the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS Agreement) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agree-
ment).2" The adoption of these two agreements has enhanced significantly the nor-
mative authority of international standards-including those of the ISO.21
18. These national standard-setting bodies differ quite extensively in their institutional struc-
tures. Some are governmental agencies (e.g., the French representative, AFNOR), while others
are strictly private (e.g., the British Standards Institution). The ISO should therefore be classified
more accurately as a hybrid body, in which private and governmental interests intermingle.
19. For the international standard-setting body covering these two fields, see the International
Electrotechnical Commission and the International Telecommunication Union Website, at http:/
/www.itu.int/ itu-t (last visited Feb. 26, 2003).
20. The SPS Agreement deals primarily with measures to protect human, animal or plant health
from hazards associated with agricultural products. See Agreement on the Application of Sani-
tary and Phytosanitary Measures, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/sps-e/spsagr-e.htm
I hereinafter SPS Agreement]. Regulations that cover other types of products are covered by the
TBT Agreement. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/Aegal_e/17-tbt_e.htm [hereinafter TBT Agreement[]. These agreements also allow the
WTO legal system to interfere in an unprecedented way in the regulatory choices of WTO Mem-
bers (covering also the scientific justification of their regulatory regime). Reinhard Quick & An-
dreas Bluthner, Has the Appellate Body Erred? An Appraisal and Criticism of the Ruling in the WTO
Hormones Case, 2 J. INT'L EcON. L. 603,627 (1999).
21. This endorsement or empowerment was achieved through several provisions in the SPS and
TBTAgreements. First, both the TBT and SPS Agreements call upon WTO Members to base their do-
mestic regulations on international standards when they exist, and to take part in their preparation.
SPS Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 3.1, 3.4; TBT Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 2.4, 2.5. These
broad, non-obligatory provisions are supported by another set of provisions that create a presumption
in favor of measures that conform to international standards, guidelines and recommendations. Such
measures or standards shall be considered as consistent with the provisions of the TBT and SPS Agree-
ments and the GATT 1994. SPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 3.2; TBT Agreement, supra note 20,
art. 2.5. This presumption provides an important incentive for states to adopt the international stan-
dards. The SPSAgreement refers in this context to three standard-setting bodies: the Codex Commis-
sion, the International Office of Epizootics, and the organizations that operate within the framework
of the International Plant Protection Convention. SPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 3.4. The TBT
Agreement does not contain a reference to a particular organization. It includes, instead, a general def-
inition of an "international body." See TBT Agreement,supra note 20, Annex 1, art. 4. The major in-
ternational players in this context are the ISO and the International Electrotechnical Commission.
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Despite its seemingly technical character, the work of the ISO has far-reaching
social implications that are not limited to the corporate domain. Perhaps the best
example of the societal importance of the ISO normative work may be found in its
new set of environmental standards, the ISO 14000 series. The ISO 14000 series in-
cludes standards for environmental management systems, environmental audit-
ing, environmental performance evaluation, environmental labeling, and life cycle
assessment.22 The ISO 14001 standard is the most widely used standard for envi-
ronmental management systems.23 Unlike some of the ISO's other products, the
ISO 14000 series is not really "technical"-at least not in the usual sense of this
term. It does not deal with technological questions2 4 or with emissions standards.
Rather, the ISO 14000 series reflects an attempt to forge a complete (prag-
matic) philosophical manual for organizations. This manual does not offer de-
tailed technological or emissions protocols, but seeks to teach organizations, in a
general and abstract fashion, how to think about environmental problems. Fur-
thermore, the normative aspiration of the ISO 14000 series is not limited to the
corporate realm. It seeks to provide a comprehensive normative discourse that
will be used by society as a whole for judging the environmental behavior of or-
ganizations. This ambitious agenda is embedded in a particular environmental
philosophy, which views environmental dilemmas as primarily technical
22. See ISO 14000 Website, at http://www.iso.ch/iso/en/iso9000-14000/iso14000/
isol4000index.html; see also Murray,supra note 9, at 35-71.
23. INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, 1SO 14001: ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS-
SPECIFICATIONS WITH GUIDANCE FOR USE (1996) [hereinafter ISO 14001]. A second standard, the
ISO 14004, includes a guidance manual. ISO 14004: ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS-
GENERAL GUIDELINES ON PRINCIPLES, SYSTEMS AND SUPPORTING TECHNIQUES (1996); see also ISO
14001 andEMAS Sites World-Wide, 5 J. INST. ENVTL. MGMT. 3,6 (1998) (survey showing that there
were 5,637 ISO sites against 2,141 sites for the competing European standard-the European
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS)-in September 1998). In recognition of the in-
creasing popularity of the ISO 14001 Environmental Management System, the new version of the
European Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) incorporates it as its environmental
management system. See EMAS Website, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ environment/emas/
indexen.htm.
24. Pollution control equipment could be based on a variety of different technologies. In the
context of air pollution these might include scrubbers, which use water to remove SOx and partic-
ulates from exhaust gases; incinerators (or thermal oxidizers), which use intense heat to destroy
organic contaminants; baghouses, which trap and remove particulates from an exhaust stream;
and catalysts, which cause chemical reactions that break the pollutants down into less harmful by-
products.
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problems of management and engineering. This technocratic stance leaves un-
challenged the basic narratives of economic growth and appropriation of nature
that guide the contemporary corporate world. The vision of the ISO 14000 series
is, therefore, highly anthropocentric: nature is posited as a mute resource with
no independent political or moral standing. With its ambitious normative reach,
and its controversial philosophical outlook, the ISO 14000 initiative should have
been the subject of a wide-ranging deliberation process. This process, however,
never took place. The principles on which the ISO 14000 is based, to which I will
return below, reflect this lack of public deliberation.
Consider first the structure of the standard-making process in the ISO. A
thorough discussion of the ISO "constitutional" framework is beyond the scope of
this article. A brief exposition will suffice to demonstrate the shortcomings of this
framework." The standard-setting process within the ISO provides little (if any)
opportunities for public participation. According to the organization's by-laws,
only ISO members have the right to receive drafts, make comments, and approve
ISO standards.26 Non-governmental organizations can only gain access to the ISO
standard-setting process as "liaison" organizations, a status that enables them to
25. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, ISO 14001: INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS STANDARDS: FIVE KEY QUESTIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRY OFFI-
CIALS 21-40 (1996) Ihereinafter FIVE KEY QUESTIONS]. The closed structure of the ISO law-
making process can be contrasted with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)-which, through a
much more open and inclusive process, seeks to develop standards of sustainability reporting.
GRI Website, at http:// www.globalreporting.org.
26. For a description of the standard setting process, see ISO, ISO/IEC DIRECTIVES, PART I: PRO-
CEDURES FOR THE TECHNICAL WORK 19-30 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter ISO/IEC DIRECTIVE]; see also
ISO, STAGES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, at http://www.iso.ch/iso/en/stds-
development/ whowhenhow/proc/proc.html. The ISO constitution distinguishes between 3
forms of membership. Full members have the right to participate as P-members in Technical
Committees, which gives them the right and obligation to vote on all questions submitted for vot-
ing within the technical committee, including enquiry drafts and Final Draft International Stan-
dards. Correspondent Members can only participate in the standard-setting work as Observing
Members (0-Members), which allows them to attend meetings, receive documents and submit
comments. A third category-subscriber membership-establishes only a very limited contact with
the ISO, and is usually reserved for countries with very small economies. See ISO, INTRODUCTION:
ISO MEMBERS, at http://www.iso.ch/ iso/en/aboutiso/isomembers/index.html; see also ISO/IEC
DIRECTIVE, supra, 1.7.1. The ISO is currently introducing a sophisticated system for electronic
balloting, which will become operative during 2001 and 2002. While the system should improve
substantially the internal democracy of the ISO, it will do very little to make the institution open
to the voices of non-members. See Reinhard Weissinger, Electronic Balloting: Get Ready--Vote
Electronically!, 32 ISO BULLETIN 3 (2001).
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observe the standard-setting process but not exercise formal voting rights. Fur-
thermore, to gain this limited access, NGOs have to get the approval of the ISO
Chief Executive Officer.27 The closed nature of the norm-production process in
the ISO is reflected also in the highly non-transparent character of the organiza-
tion. The ISO does not offer free access to approved standards or to draft versions
of future standards. External observers must purchase the standards if they want
to review them.
28
A 1996 UNCTAD Report, which examined the participatory profile of the
work that led to the publication of the ISO 14000 series, sheds some light on the
problematic nature of this constitutional set-up.29 The preparatory work for the
ISO 14000 was coordinated by a special Technical Committee (TC 207). The
UNCTAD report examined the share of developing countries in the work of
TC 207. While sixty-eight percent of ISO full members are developing countries
and only twenty percent are developed countries, developing countries consti-
tuted only forty-nine percent of TC 207 membership (against a forty-three per-
cent share of developed countries).3" Furthermore, despite their seemingly
"equal" share in the formal membership of TC 207, developing countries had a
much lower share in the actual work of the committee.3 The UNCTAD Report
further indicates that there was almost no civic participation in the preparation
of the ISO 14000 standards.3 2
The principles on which the ISO 14000 is based reflect the closed nature of the
organization. The ISO 14001 standard seeks to create a framework that will en-
courage organizations to improve continuously their overall environmental
27. See ISO/IEC DIRECTIVE, supra note 26, 1.17.3.
28. The ISO retains intellectual property rights over all of its standards. Indeed, 20% of its bud-
get is based on revenues from the sale of the Organization's standards and other publications. See
INT'L ORG. OF STANDARDIZATION, INTRODUCTION: How is ISO's WORK FINANCED?, at http://
www.iso.ch/iso/en/aboutiso/ introduction/finance.html.
29. See FIVE KEY QUESTIONS, supra note 25.
30. Id. at 25. The rest were countries from Central/Eastern Europe.
31. This conclusion draws on an analysis of two important meetings of TC 207, which took
place in Oslo and Rio in 1995 and 1996. The Report notes that a survey of the participants indi-
cates that only a small share of the developing-country members had actually participated in the
meetings. This was reflected also in the substantial difference in the size of the delegations. Thus,
for example, in Oslo 79% of the delegates were from developed countries and in Rio, 55%. The
Oslo meeting was particularly important because this was where approval of the ISO
14001standard as a Draft International Standard was discussed. See id. at 23-26.
32. See id. at 22-23.
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performance.33 It attempts to achieve this goal through a very simple scheme,
based on five general principles: commitment and policy, planning, implementa-
tion, measurement and evaluation, and, finally, review and further implementa-
tion. What links these principles together is a general commitment to a dynamic
cyclical process of "plan, implement, check and review.
34
This conceptual framework is highly problematic. In the first place, it gives
the organization wide discretion, both in devising its environmental plan and in
designing the environmental indicators according to which it will measure its per-
formance.31 If the basic compliance level derived from the local regulatory frame-
work is low, as might be the case in many developing countries, the commitment
for "continual improvement" might mean very little.36 A second weakness of the
ISO 14001 model concerns its approach to the issue of public participation. Article
4.4.3 of ISO 14001 requires the organization only to "consider processes for exter-
nal communication on its significant environmental aspects and [to] record its de-
cision."37 The organization is not required to publish an annual environmental
statement.38 The non-participatory nature of the ISO is reflected then in the struc-
ture of the standards themselves. The ISO constitutes a paradigmatic example of
democratic deficiency in the new global legal arena.
33. See ISO 14001, supra note 23, at 6.
34. Id.; see also Murray, supra note 9, at 45-48.
35. The introduction to ISO 14001 provides that: "[Tihis International Standard does not estab-
lish absolute requirements for environmental performance beyond commitment, in the policy, to
compliance with applicable legislation and regulations and to continual improvement." ISO
14001,supra note 23, at 6.
36. Note also that under the ISO 14001 scheme, a firm can legitimately respond to nonconfor-
mance by reducing the stringency of its declared goals on the ground that the initial goals were "in-
appropriate" (as long as the new goals comply with the local law). See Jason Switzer & John
Ehrenfeld, Independent Environmental Auditors: What Does ISO 14001 Registration Really Mean?,
ENVTL. QUALITY MGMT., Autumn 1999, at 27.
37. ISO 14001,supra note 23, art. 4.4.3 (emphasis added).
38. Switzer & Ehrenfeld, supra note 36, at 29. This approach to the disclosure issue mainly re-
flects the concern of the U.S. business community that such disclosure would act as a platform for
criminal or civil litigation, and not as a basis for constructive dialogue. Id. at 27; see also Murray,
supra note 9, at 53-54. The U.S. business community has been pushing for the adoption of statu-
tory mechanisms that would provide those organizations that have a certified EMS program with
some immunity from liability, or a qualified privilege. This campaign has succeeded in prompting
some legal changes. Murray, supra note 9, at 53-62.
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II. THE FALLACY OF WESTPHALIA
Despite continuous and various critiques, the Westphalian vision still plays
a major role in the debate about the legitimacy of transnational legal structures.
Those who adopt the Westphalian viewpoint are willing to admit that over the
last decade, there has been a significant shift in the balance of power between the
state and transnational levels. They maintain, however, that this transfer of
power does not require any radical changes in the way global governance is pro-
duced, and, in particular, should not change our basic conception of the nation-
state as the main arena for political deliberation (and the ultimate source for le-
gitimacy). I will argue that the Westphalian argument is unconvincing. To ap-
preciate this claim we need to examine more closely the structure of the
Westphalian argument.
From the Westphalian perspective, international law was understood as a
product of diplomatic negotiations between sovereign states.39 As such, its "legit-
imacy" was derived solely from state consent 4 -whether to a specific set of
norms, or to the establishment of an international body with norm-producing
powers. The state citizenry played no role in the production of consent or, in-
deed, legitimacy. The Westphalian version of international law cared very little
about the nature of the domestic political process that preceded the formal act of
consent.4' The consent requirement was interpreted as a purely formalistic con-
39. Thus, for example, international environmental law was defined as the "collective body of
agreements among states regarding mutual rights and obligations affecting the environment....
Enforcement of its provisions, customary or specified by treaty, are usually sought through negoti-
ation (e.g., diplomacy) rather than through adjudication." See LYNTON K. CALDWELL, INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: FROM THE TWENTIETH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 146 (3rd.
ed. 1996) (emphasis added).
40. The strongest expression of this view is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 Ihereinafter Vienna Convention] (explaining in particular the defini-
tions of "ratification," "acceptance," "approval," and "accession" in Article 2 of the Convention);
see also Bodansky, supra note 14, at 604.
41. Thus, the only hint in the Vienna Convention to the possible tension between the formal
consent of the state and the will of the people is indirect. Article 46 provides that: "(1) A State may
not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a pro-
vision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent un-
less that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law offundamental importance; (2)
A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the mat-
ter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith." Vienna Convention, supra note 40, at
art. 46 (emphasis added).
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dition.4" Contemporary writers have tried to add a democratic twist to this very
formalistic story. The consent requirement was interpreted not just as a formal
rule of constitutional adequacy, but as a reflection of more substantial demand:
to subject the diplomatic process, which took place at the transnational level, to
a meaningful bottom-up political supervision. While the structure and spirit of
this supervision were to be determined by the state and not by international law,
it was assumed, nonetheless, that the consent of the state was a product of mean-
ingful political deliberation.43
The social transformations of the last decade, however, have cast deep doubts
on this narrative of legitimacy.44 First, the vision of indirect democratic supervi-
sion is based on an unrealistic view of the political game within the state. Contrary
to the assumptions of the Westphalian model, the constitutional framework of
most states does not provide a suitable space for discussing transnational issues,
nor does it create proper mechanisms for monitoring the processes (e.g., interna-
tional negotiations, inner-institutional deliberations) that lead to the creation of
transnational norms. Second, and more importantly, the Westphalian vision of a
highly fragmented political plane, comprised of detached polities, is at odds with
the intensifying societal demand to subject transnational normative processes to
worldwide deliberation. Global dilemmas cannot be debated in a fragmented
fashion; they require a global conversation. The Westphalian model of frag-
mented deliberation and detached polities is seen, then, as a barrier to the devel-
opment of more internationally oriented communicative processes.
A further difficulty with the Westphalian worldview stems from its very
strict interpretation of "delegated authority." This interpretation provided the ra-
tionale and justification for the creation of international institutions with norm-
making powers. Under this understanding, the various international institutions
set up through treaty-making processes were portrayed as highly controllable en-
tities that were completely dependent on the states that had put them in place.
This portrait fails to appreciate, however, the increasingly autonomous nature of
42. Id. art. 7.
43. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law: Les-
sons for Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in Non-Economic Areas, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L.
189, 231 (1999).
44. See Robert Howse, Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade
Law: The Early Years of WTO Jurisprudence, in THE EU, THE WTO, AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A
COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE?, 35 (J.H.H. Weiler ed., 2001).
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these global legal networks, and the fact that they rely on bases of support located
outside that state system. In that sense, these transnational legal systems are
shielded, in varying degrees, from the influence of inter-state politics. This kind
of deep independence characterizes both state-oriented regimes such as the
WTO45 and global private regimes, such as standardization or internet domains.
Consider, in this context, two examples of state-oriented systems: the World
Trade Organization and the Climate Change Convention.46 While the WTO is
indeed a product of multilateral negotiations between nation-states, its legal sys-
tem is highly autonomous. Neither the political forum of the WTO (that is the
WTO membership acting as a collective) nor the WTO Secretariat (the executive
branch of the WTO) has the right to interfere directly in the operation of the
WTO adjudicative system.47 WTO members are obliged to fulfill the results of
the adjudication process, and may suffer sanctions if they fail to do so.48 Therefore,
the WTO legal tribunals-the panels and the Appellate Body-enjoy a substan-
tial degree of autonomy in their judicial work. While a WTO member can, of
course, withdraw its membership from the WTO,49 this course of action is very
problematic, because most members-even superpowers like the United States
and the European Union-are highly dependent on the legal framework that was
created by the WTO treaties. Furthermore, the WTO does not rely only on the
45. For a survey of some of these other systems, see Petersmann,supra note 43, at 208-29. Para-
doxically, the much older International Court of Justice has turned into a minor player in the in-
ternational legal arena because of its limited jurisdiction.
46. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/
CONE 151/26, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849.
47. To be more precise, the WTO political forum (acting in its capacity as the Dispute Settlement
Body) can overrule the decisions of the WTO judicial bodies only byfull consensus. Since the win-
ning party is unlikely to join such a political maneuver it seems highly improbable that such a con-
sensus could be attained in practice. The autonomy of the WTO legal system is guaranteed by the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 15, 1993, 33
I.L.M. 112 [hereinafter DSUI. The "reverse" consensus principle is elaborated in Articles 16.4 and
17.14 of the DSU. The Dispute Settlement Body was created to oversee the operation of the DSU.
Id. art. 2. Its composition is identical to that of the WTO General Council. Id. art. 4.3. In this context,
the WTO differs, substantially, from its predecessor, the GATT. For a more detailed discussion of
the WTO legal system, see Oren Perez, Ecological Sensitivity and Global Legal Pluralism: Rethink-
ing the Trade and Environment Debate (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, London School of
Economics and Political Science) (available at the London School of Economics library).
48. DSU,supra note 47, arts. 22, 23.
49. This is unlike most citizens, who cannot leave their country (in a practical sense) if they do
not agree with the rulings of their national legal system.
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support of the state system. The expanding community of multinational enter-
prises, which is highly dependent on the pro-trade climate that the WTO facili-
tates, constitutes an important source of non-state support for the WTO.s°
Similarly, the normative aspirations of the Climate Change Convention do
not depend only on political support from the inter-state level. They also reflect
(a-political) scientific and moral conversations that take place at the global
level."' A good example is the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC). The IPCC plays a key role in the assessment of the scientific,
technical, and socio-economic information relevant for the understanding of the
risk of human-induced climate change. 2 Its various reports provide indepen-
dent support for the normative aspirations of the Climate Change Convention
and the Kyoto Protocol. Thus, for example, in its 2001 Report, the IPCC Work-
ing Group I reconfirmed that "felmissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols due
to human activities continue to alter the atmosphere in ways that are expected to
affect the climate. ' 53 The Report argued that these activities are likely to cause a
rise in global average temperatures and sea level, which, in turn, are likely to
trigger extreme climatic phenomena.54 It further noted that improvement in
modeling techniques enables scientists to be more confident in their ability to
make useful projections of future climate.55 So, when George W. Bush decided
to renege on the semi-formal obligations of the United States under the Kyoto
50. With the increase-in scale and scope-oftransnational commerce, the level of this political
backing outweighs the opposition of local, non-exporting, industries.
51. For the role of scientific communities in shaping environmental regimes, see, e.g., Peter M
Haas, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone, 46
INT'L ORG. 187, 187-88 (1992). The remaining influence of such communities stands in contrast to
the visible decline in the trust in experts. It is hard to reconcile these two phenomena.
52. See IPCC Website,at http://www.ipcc.ch.. IPCC was'established in 1988 by the World Mete-
orological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme. It groups together
dozens of scientists from all over the world, basing its assessment mainly on published literature
(it does not carry out new research).
53. CLIMATE CHANGE 2OO1: THE SCIENTIFiC BASis 5 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter
SCIENTIFIC BASIS1. Current data indicates that the atmospheric concentration of CO 2 has increased
by 31% since 1750. The carbon cycle models, which were surveyed by the IPCC, found that by
2100, CO 2 concentrations are likely to increase by 90 to 250%. Id. at 7, 12.
54. Id. at 13, 15. These extreme phenomena include, for example, more intense precipitation
events in the Northern Hemisphere's mid to high latitude land areas, and increased summer con-
tinental drying and associated risk of drought. Id. at 15.
55. Id. at 9.
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Protocol,56 he had to consider not only the potential reactions of its governmental
counterparts, but also how its decision might be seen in light of these indepen-
dent global discourses. In justifying his opposition to the Kyoto Protocol in
terms of the "incomplete state of scientific knowledge of the causes of, and solu-
tions to, global climate change,"57 President Bush risks losing his political credi-
bility because of the inconsistency of his arguments with the findings and
conclusions of the recent IPCC report.58
The final blow to the Westphalian worldview and its notion of "indirect dem-
ocratic supervision" comes from the increasingly important role of private inter-
national regimes in today's world. When we move to the private domain-to the
realm of the lex mercatoria or to the domain of technical standardization-the
Westphalian idea of state consent loses any credible meaning. The traditional doc-
trine of international law viewed the legitimacy of these legal structures through
the lexicon of "private international law." In the eyes of private international law,
these "private global regimes" derived their power and legitimacy either from the
autonomous will of individuals (or firms) who freely adopt them in voluntary
market transactions (the freedom of contract hypothesis), or from the decision of
the state formally to endorse them (the endorsement hypothesis).
Both of these hypotheses fail to characterize properly the way in which these
new forms of private law are communicated and employed in practice. This fail-
ure stems primarily from a disregard of the constraints that face individuals,
56. Julian Borger, Bush Kills Global Warming Treaty, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 29, 2001, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/globalwarming/story/O,7369,464920,OO.html.
57. Letter from George Bush, President of the United States, to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig,
and Roberts, Members of United States Congress (Mar. 13, 2001), http://www.globalclimate.org/
bushletter.htm.
58. The last report of the IPCC was used extensively by the media in this context. See, e.g., Tim
Radford, Top Scientists Isolate Bush by Backing Kyoto, THE GUARDIAN, May 18, 2001, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/globalwarming/story/0,7369,492776,00.htm; see also William K.
Reilly, A Climate Policy That Works, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. l, 2001, sec. 4 at 17; Global Flip-Flop, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 30, 2001. The IPCC scientists draw completely different conclusions from their data.
They argue that "[rieductions in greenhouse gas emissions and the gases that control their concen-
trations would be necessary to stabilise radiative forcing." In practical terms this would require
"global anthropogenic CO 2 emissions to drop below 1990 levels, within a few decades.., and con-
tinue to decrease steadily thereafter. Eventually CO 2 emissions would need to decline to a very
small fraction of current emissions." SCIENTIFIC BASIS, supra note 53, at 12 (emphasis added). The
Bush administration has recently asked the National Academy of Science (NAS) to assess the con-
clusions of the IPCC 2001 Report. The NAS Report generally confirms the IPCC conclusions. See
NAS COMMITTEE ON THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS
OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS (2001).
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firms, and states when they decide whether to accept a particular (private) norm.
In the first place, many of these new legal systems, and their associated lawmak-
ing institutions, enjoy substantive market power (or, rather, normative power)., 9
The freedom of contract metaphor ignores this normative power, and thus does
not give a realistic account of the spectrum of choices that individuals or firms
face when they decide whether to adopt a particular norm. The endorsement
hypothesis suffers from similar flaws. First, much like individuals, nations are
influenced by market power considerations. Thus, for example, in its recent en-
vironmental management regulation, the European Commission has decided to
adopt the ISO 14001 standard as its environmental management system because
it found that the system established by the original regulation could not compete
successfully against the ISO standard."
Second, the capacity of nation-states to interfere in these norm-production
processes, whether directly or through non-endorsement, has been substantially
eroded by a variety of multilateral treaties, the most important of which is the 1958
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards. The New York Convention ensures a worldwide exclusive jurisdiction
to arbitration proceedings based on valid arbitration agreements, provides proce-
dures for the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards, and limits the
grounds on which domestic courts can refuse requests for enforcement to a few
basic procedural defects. The adoption of the principle of non-interference has
turned the New York Convention into more than a mechanism of enforcement;
it created a space of non-interference in which these different systems of global
law could have evolved independently of the influence of inter-state politics.6
While the new transnational legal regimes do build on the legal infrastructure of
the nation-state (e.g., for enforcement services), they developed various mecha-
nisms that shelter them from extensive state-sponsored intervention.
The contemporary institutions of the nation-state fail, therefore, to provide
a suitable answer to the democratic challenge of the new "law without a state.""
59. The new WTO regime has contributed to this market power, especially in the context of
standardization processes, through the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement. See SPS Agree-
ment, supra note 20; TBT Agreement, supra note 20.
60. See Environmental Management System Requirements, Annex I of the revised EMAS,
http/ www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/emas.
61. As of March 20, 2003, the Convention had 133 parties. Updated data about the status of the
Convention can be found at the UNCITRAL Website, at http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm
(last visited Apr. 26, 2003).
62. The phrase was coined by Gunther Teubner. See generally Teubner, supra note 1.
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The capacity of the state to act as an exclusive source and arbiter of legitimacy
has been substantially eroded.
III. THE UNIVERSALISTIC DREAM:
FROM NGO-LED DEMOCRATIZATION TO DIRECT DELIBERATION
The ideas of NGO-led democratization and direct deliberation have grown
out of a deep dissatisfaction with the Westphalian-inspired separation between
the state and inter-state levels. They reflect an attempt to substitute the frag-
mented vision of the Westphalian paradigm with a more universalistic vision of
democracy seeking to redefine the space in which governance is produced.
While these two narratives share a common vision-the need to develop a
worldwide democratic experience-they differ in the way in which they envi-
sion this experience, and the conditions for its realization. This section provides
both an introduction and critique of these two models.
Before I proceed to a critique of these two models, I want to put aside a more
radical vision of transnational democracy: global federalism. The thesis of global
federalism is that a global federal framework might be developed on the U.S. or
EU model, with an independent parliament, executive branch, and a unified legal
system (with unlimited jurisdiction and an enforcement mechanism).63 Despite its
various appeals, I do not believe this thesis provides a plausible starting point for
the project oftransnational democracy. First, its inconsistency with the traditional
concept of state sovereignty does not seem to take into account the strong staying
power of the nation-state. Second, it is not clear that such an ambitious project
could actually succeed without the support of a (currently missing) global demos. 4
Finally, the dangers of erecting such a mammoth bureaucratic structure are sub-
stantial. Indeed, the widespread objections within the European Union to the
work of the European Commission illustrate the problems that such a mammoth
bureaucracy produce: corruption, arrogance, and detachment.
63. See, e.g., DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 18 (1993); David
Held, Regulating Globalization? The Reinvention of Politics, 15 INT'L Soc. 394 (2000) [hereinafter
Regulating Globalization?].
64. See Bodansky, supra note 14, at 600.
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A. NGO-Led Transnational Democracy
The advocates of NGO-led democratization postulate that the NGO com-
munity should lead the reform of global politics. Giving NGOs a greater say in
the production of transnational norms-by extending their rights of participa-
tion in treaty negotiations and international adjudicative processes-should
render transnational governance more legitimate.6" The incorporation of NGOs
in the institutional apparatus that produces transnational norms is put forward,
then, as a response to the increasing civic demand for a voice.
This thesis is highly problematic, however, primarily because the logic of le-
gitimacy and democracy that drives it is both incoherent and self-defeating.
First, the call for more extensive participation of NGOs leaves unresolved the
question of the social legitimacy of these organizations. Most of these organiza-
tions are not governed in a democratic fashion. It is not clear why they should be
treated as true representatives of the public.66 This problem is exacerbated by the
fact that NGOs are not truly transnational; they have deep national, geographi-
cal, and cultural ties. Those NGOs that have a strong international presence
(e.g., Greenpeace, World Wildlife Foundation, and Friends of the Earth) tend to
have a strong Northern affiliation. These geocultural ties and biases cast doubts
on the ability of the model of NGO-led democratization to bridge the gap be-
tween Northern and Southern communities. Indeed, developing countries have
been highly suspicious of this idea. Thus, for example, in the recent Shrimp-
Turtle dispute at the WTO,67 all the developing countries that were party to the
65. In the context of the WTO, see Daniel C. Esty, Why the World Trade Organization Needs En-
vironmental NGOs, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development Working Paper
(1999), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/html/faculty/danesty/wtrade.pdf; see also
Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization,
17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331 (1996); G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Partici-
pation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L. ECON. L. 359 (1996).
For a similar argument in the context of the ICJ, see Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongov-
ernmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611 (1994). In many
organizations, taking this path would require a radical transformation of their decision-making
structure. See id.;see also Shrimp Report, supra note 7.
66. Some NGOs have developed firm cognitive and moral reputations over the last years. These
reputations could provide an independent, non-democratic ground for the claim for more extensive
participatory rights for NGOs (as a way for improving the substantial quality of governance pro-
cesses). The proponents of NGO-led democratization, however, tend to ground their claims on
democratic, rather than instrumental grounds.
67. Shrimp Report, supra note 7.
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dispute strictly opposed the U.S. proposal to allow NGOs to submit amicus
briefs to WTO tribunals."
But this model is not just democratically incoherent. Its implementation
could adversely affect civic society itself. Consider, for instance, the case of NGO
participation in WTO proceedings. Opening the adjudicative process to NGOs
will impose a difficult burden on the WTO legal system. In order to avoid the
overcrowding of its adjudicative system, the WTO will have to devise some
screening mechanism. This mechanism (however noble the intentions of its de-
signers might be) could have broad "undemocratic" side-effects. First, devising
a fair screening criterion is an extremely difficult task. On what basis should the
WTO distinguish (and choose) between the manifold environmental, business,
art, and labor groups which will knock on its doors? By definition, any screen-
ing mechanism will be non-democratic. Furthermore, whatever this criterion
might be, it will have to be applied by the WTO itself. The WTO will, therefore,
have the power to decide which of these manifold groups is worthy of an entry-
ticket into the trade world.69 It, will, in other words, act as the supreme coordi-
nator of the NGO world.7" But the WTO will not operate just as a gatekeeper. It
will function also as a supreme cognitive arbiter. By subjecting themselves to the
jurisdiction of the WTO, NGOs will have to accept as legitimate not only the
WTO screening authority, but also its cognitive supremacy. This could limit se-
verely their ability to criticize the WTO system from the outside. The WTO (or
any other transnational institution) will thus be given the power to intervene in,
or even contaminate, the inner world of the global civic society.
68. See id. 29-33, 46. The meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), in the aftermath
of the Shrimp decision, reflected a similar mood. See Minutes of Meeting, DSB, Held in the Centre
William Rappard, Nov. 6,1998, WT/DSB/M/50, available through the WTO Documents Gate-
way: http:// www.wto.org/english/docs-e/docse.htm. Surprisingly, none of the delegates of the
developed countries (apart from the U.S. delegate) who spoke at the meeting (which included the
European Union, Switzerland, Australia and Japan) supported this idea, with Japan strongly ob-
jecting to it. The developing countries demonstrate similar suspicion toward the environmental
and labor agenda of the developed countries, seeing it as a pretext for protectionism. See, for ex-
ample, the position of Henrique Cardozo, President of Brazil, in his address at the FTAA meeting
in Quebec, quoted in A Cautious Yes to Pan-American Trade, THE ECONOMisT, Apr. 28, 2001, at 57.
69. One way in which the "screening" problem could be overcome is to give the NGO commu-
nity the right (and obligation) to decide which organization would have, at any specific dispute,
the right to appear before the WTO judicial tribunals.
70. The recent asbestos case, in which the Appellate Body first offered NGOs an opportunity to
apply for a leave to submit an amicus brief and then refused all the applications, is a perfect illus-
tration of this problem. See EC-Asbestos, supra note 7, 50-57.
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The recent experience of the WTO with NGO participation vividly illus-
trates the problematic of such arrangement. In its recent decision in the Shrimp
case, the Appellate Body apparently came a step closer toward accepting the po-
sition of its critics, by ruling that WTO panels have the right to accept amicus
briefs from NGOs even if the briefs were not explicitly invited by them.7' This
ruling was seen by some as an important move toward the democratization of
the WTO regime.72 A closer look at the way in which this ruling was applied in
practice, however, reveals a different picture.73 First, the Appellate Body made
clear that panels have no obligation to accept amicus briefs.74 It emphasized that
as part of the panels' broad authority over the adjudicative process, any panel has
"the discretionary authority either to accept and consider or to reject informa-
tion and advice submitted to it, whether requested by a panel or not."75 Second, the
way in which the Appellate Body has implemented its liberal interpretation in
practice is highly problematic. While the Appellate Body decided to accept the
NGO briefs that were attached to the U.S. submissions, it did not consider the
substantial arguments that were included in them.76 The Appellate Body de-
fended this decision by noting that the "United States has itself accepted the
briefs in a tentative and qualified manner only."77 The Appellate Body thus sig-
naled that in its opinion the submissions of the NGOs were not worthy, in and
of themselves, of substantial consideration. This reflects a deep skepticism with
respect to the cognitive credibility of NGO representations.
The same kind of ambivalence toward NGOs was demonstrated by the Ap-
pellate Body in another more recent case, in the dispute between the European
Union and Canada over a French ban on the import of asbestos and asbestos
71. The ruling was based on a liberal interpretation of Article 13 of the Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding, which deals with the right of panels to seek information from third parties. See
Shrimp Report, supra note 7, 99-109.
72. See, e.g., Howse, supra note 44, at 47-51.
73. See Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: Untangling the Nets, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 477 (999).
74. Shrimp Report, supra note 7, f 104, 108.
75. Id. 108 (emphasis in original).
76. Id. 89-91.
77. Id. 91. The Appellate Body notes that the United States "has confirmed its agreement
with the legal arguments in the attached submissions of the non-governmental organizations, to
the extent that those arguments 'concur with the U.S. arguments set out in [its] main submission."'
Id. 90. The Appellate Body understood this formulation, quite correctly, as saying the United
States is not responsible for contrary views. This, of course, raises the question of the independent
credibility of NGOs' submissions.
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products from Canada.78 In a controversial move, the Appellate Body decided to
enable non-parties to apply for leave to file an amicus brief with the Appellate
Body in relation to the dispute.79 Several leading environmental groups and re-
search institutions8 0 accepted the Appellate Body's invitation and filed requests
to make legal submissions in the case. The Appellate Body decided, however, to
refuse all the applications. In its recent decision the Appellate Body noted only
that the applicants "failed to comply sufficiently" with the requirements for sub-
mission.8' It seems somewhat strange that none of the NGOs' briefs submitted to
the Appellate Body have complied with its formal requirements.
What facially appeared as a path-breaking jurisprudential innovation had,
then, little practical impact on the openness of the WTO legal system. This piece
of legal experience is not just a reflection of the WTO organizational culture. It
reflects the deep problematic of the idea of NGO-led democratization.
B. Directly Deliberative Democracy and Legitimacy
The deep shortcomings of the models of global federalism and NGO-led
democratization have led many observers and critics to point to directly deliber-
ative democracy as a more tenable vision for transnational democratization. The
concept of direct deliberation interprets the democratic process as "collective
decision-making that proceeds through direct participation by and reason-
78. WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions, European Communities Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, Sept. 18, 2000, WT/DS135. The Panel has rejected the Canadian com-
plaint, accepting the French Article XX(b) argument. The Appellate Body decision, which upheld
the Panel ruling, was published on March 12, 2001. See EC-Asbestos,supra note 7.
79. WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions, European Communities Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products: Appellate Body Communication, Nov. 8, 2000, WT/DS135/9, available
at http:// www.wto.org/english/news-e/news00_e/ds135_9.doc, quoted in EC-Asbestos, supra note
7, 52 (prescribing detailed requirements for the application process in this case).
80. Overall, eleven organizations filed for leave to file a written brief within the time limits set
by the Appellate Body, among them Greenpeace International, World Wide Fund for Nature-
International, Ban Asbestos Network, the International Ban Asbestos Secretariat, the Foundation
for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD), and the Center for Interna-
tional Environmental Law (CIEL). EC-Asbestos, supra note 7, 56.
81. Id. In a special meeting of the WTO General Council on November 22, 2000, the members
warned the Appellate Body to proceed with extreme caution in the future with respect to how it
deals with NGO participation in the dispute settlement process. International Centre for Trade
and Sustainable Development, WTO General Council Slaps Appellate Body on Amicus Briefs,
BRIDGEs, Nov. 28, 2000, at 1. This response, though it has no formal legal meaning, demonstrates
how problematic the issue of NGO participation is.
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giving between and among free and equal citizens."82 The public in this notion
of democracy is interpreted "as the arena in which free and equal citizens reflect
on and seek to advance common aims."83 This democratic vision does not de-
pend for its realization on the development of a comprehensive global polity,
with stable, overarching institutions. It offers a more modest vision, which por-
trays the (transnational) democratic experience as a fragmented adventure that
could take place simultaneously in multiple communities and through different
intermediaries.8 4 These multiple communities could have different anchors:
shared concerns (e.g., saving the tropical forests), common identities (gender is-
sues), or common business interests (shareholders). The concept of direct delib-
eration thus circumvents the various difficulties associated with the idea of
global federalism. Furthermore, this fragmented view of the political experience
fits nicely with the decentralized nature of contemporary global law, which
knows no "universal center."85
The idea of direct deliberation as a legitimization strategy builds on two dif-
ferent (and not necessarily interdependent) interpretations of the link between
democracy and legitimacy. The first interpretation links the idea of legitimacy to
the capacity of collective deliberation to produce-through the power of the
"better argument"-inter-subjective agreement (and hence, consent). The sec-
ond interprets the legitimizing force of the democratic process as a cultural con-
struct, as a product of a widely-shared belief in the legitimacy of decisions that
were made through a fair and society-wide dialogue. Whereas the first account
attributes the legitimization force of the democratic process to its capacity to
82. Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUR. L.J. 313, 314 (1997),
available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/ddp.html.
83. Id. at 337; see also Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experi-
mentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
84. See David Goldblatt, Review at the Limits of Political Possibility: The Cosmopolitan Demo-
cratic Project, 225 NEW LEFT REV. 140, 146 (19 9 7 ); see also Regulating Globalization?, supra note 63,
at 400. Held notes in that context that a "democratic political community for the new millennium
necessarily describes a world where citizens enjoy multiple citizenships." Id. at 402.
85. The idea that international society would develop multiple legal centers instead of a single
"Supreme Court" has not received enough attention in the legal literature. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound,
Address at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts College, A World Legal Order: Law
and Laws in Relation to World Law 41-42 (19 5 9); see also Richard Falk, A New Paradigm for Inter-
national Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPEC-
TIVE 651 (Richard Falk et al. eds., 1985).
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produce argument-based consent, the second associates this force to the cultural
standing of the democratic ethos.86
From the perspective of directly deliberative democracy, the only feasible
response to the democratic challenge of the new transnational law lies, then, in
the development of novel arenas for deliberation, which could break the mold of
the current nationalistic order and offer a realistic alternative to the utopian
model of global federalism. This pragmatic agenda raises two distinct questions.
First, to what extent is the vision of directly deliberative democracy marred by
practical difficulties? Second, is the response of the direct-deliberation school to
the question of the democracy-legitimacy linkage really convincing? The first
question is considered below, the second in Part IV.
C. The Internet as a Global Deliberative Medium
The practical dilemma posed by the idea of global deliberation can be stated
quite simply: is there a feasible institutional structure/design which could enable
the global civic society to review, scrutinize, and participate in the game of tran-
snational norm production? The Internet, with its ability to cut time and space
barriers, has been identified by many observers as the only medium through
which the vision of transnational democracy might be realized.87 The following
section seeks to examine this argument more closely.
The advantage of the Internet as a medium for deliberation lies in its capacity
to support multi-directional communication that is not limited by geographical
boundaries. The term "multi-directional communication" refers to communica-
tion processes in which all the participants share similar influence over the subject
86. For the importance of fairness in the legitimacy of supranational adjudication, see, e.g.,
Howse, supra note 44, at 42-51.
87. For example, the Financial Times argued that the "nature of civil disobedience is being irre-
vocably transformed by the Internet and modern communications." The Changing Face of Protest,
FIN. TIMES, July 3 1/Aug. 1, 1999, at 12; see also Geoffrey Nunberg, Will the Internet Always Speak
English?, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 27-Apr. 10, 2000,availableat http://www.prospect.org/print/vl 1/10/
nunberg-g.html (noting that the "forums of the Internet undoubtedly create the opportunity for a
wider and more participatory public discourse than has ever before been possible"); Paul Starr,
The Electronic Commons, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 27-Apr. 10, 2000, available at http'I/www.pros-
pect.org/print/vi 1/10/starr-p.html.
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matter, time, and speed of communication."9 This concept envisions the electronic
domain as a non-hierarchical environment, one that is not controlled by a central
authority and that provides all participants with an equal opportunity to initiate
and influence the conversation. 9 A multi-directional communication process
could be achieved by various mechanisms, such as e-mail, discussion forums, chat
rooms, e-newsletters, and comprehensive e-archives. °
Despite the undeniable advantages of the Internet, using it as a vehicle for
democratization is fraught with difficulties. 9' First, shifting the deliberation
process to the electronic domain does not in itself guarantee the emergence of an
actual participatory community, because it does not resolve the basic collective
action dilemma that characterizes any political action. This collective action di-
lemma arises because the participants in a transnational deliberative process
contribute, in effect, to the production of a public good (e.g., a new normative
structure) whose benefits accrue to the transnational community as a whole-
including those members who did not bother to participate in the deliberative
process. 2 This "free-rider" dilemma is further exacerbated by the broad oppor-
tunities for political and non-political action on the Internet, which extend the
allure of "free-riding." The immensity of the Internet could thus have a crip-
pling effect on the capacity of society to generate e-political action.
This pessimistic prognosis is supported by the extensive psychological re-
search, done over the last few years, on the question of spontaneous provision of
public goods.93 This research indicates that a large and scattered collection of in-
dividuals who have little sense of collective identity constitutes a poor basis for
88. 1 draw here on the discussion of communication and digital democracy in Jan van Dijk, Mod-
els of Democracy and Concepts of Communication, in DIGITAL DEMOCRACY: ISSUES OF THEORY & PRAC-
TICE 30,45-48 (Kenneth L. Hacker & Jan van Dijk eds., 2000) [hereinafter DIGITAL DEMOCRACY].
89. The interactive feature of the Internet distinguishes it from the traditional uni-directional
broadcasting technologies, such as television or radio.
90. These different mechanisms enable both the facilitation of collective dialogue and the cre-
ation of group memory. See van Dijk,supra note 88, at 42-44.
91. For an even more skeptical view of e-democracy, see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace
2.0, 79 TEx. L. REV. 447, 456-59 (2000).
92. This account of the collective action dilemma is in the tradition of Mancur Olson. For a re-
cent overview of Olson's work, see lain McLean, Review Article: The Divided Legacy ofMancur O1-
son, 30. J. POL. ScI., 651-68 (2000).
93. For a survey of this research, see ANDREW M. COLMAN, GAME THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS
IN THE SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, 215-21 (1995); see alo Toshio Yamagishi & Karen S.
Cook, Generalized Exchange and Social Dilemmas, 56 Soc. PSYCH. Q. 235 (1993).
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the emergence of spontaneous cooperation. Mechanizing political action-
through various technologies from sophisticated filtering programs to auto-
mated "democratic" agents-might cut the opportunity costs of participation,
and thus resolve part of the free rider problem. Using these automated interme-
diaries, however, might contaminate the deliberation process. Technological in-
termediaries are not neutral agents-they are products of the purposive design
of firms, markets, and technological fashion-and, as such, can reflect particular
political or economic agendas.
94
The technological advantages of the Internet cannot guarantee the emer-
gence of global political action (even where shared global concerns do exist).
This insight points to a second difficulty in using the Internet as a global political
medium. To succeed, the project of electronic participation will require central
coordination and continuous public investment in an electronic public space,
which will provide the appropriate conditions for the evolution of public con-
versation.95 Private players, whether NGOs or individuals, seldom have the nec-
essary resources to provide (at least on an exclusive basis) these types of
coordination services. These services could be provided either by governments
or by the private market. But the price of this central coordination is high: the
deliberation process could lose its purity and become hierarchical. Whoever con-
trols the infrastructure that supports the e-deliberation process could influence
and manipulate this process in various ways.
96
94. Lawrence Lessig was probably one of the first writers to point out the non-neutral nature of
Internet technology. He argues that the software code, the architecture upon which the Internet
operates, can serve not just as a medium for individual liberty, but also (and quite as readily) as a
tool of domination and control. See Lawrence Lessig, Architectingfor Control, Keynote at the In-
ternet Political Economy Forum, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, May 11, 2000. The
main problem with this new regulatory technology, Lessig argues, is that it operates unseen, wired
deep within the software and hardware we use. Id. Furthermore, it is the product of undemocratic
decisions of firms and governments. I think, however, that Lessig somewhat overstates this "tech-
nological" threat. The recent technological and commercial developments in the Net-world con-
stitute a threat to e-political action, not so much in the constraints they impose on individual
liberty, but primarily in their capacity to overshadow political opportunities by offering an almost
infinite horizon of non-political choices. On that point, see Netanel,supra note 91, at 471.
95. By "central coordination" I refer to all the various actions that might be needed in order to
facilitate political action on the Net. These include, for example, building a designated space in
which people can exchange views and read background material, maintaining email lists of po-
tential participants, building alert services, creating archives, and finally designing and executing
the participatory process itself. See id. at 484-91.
96. Such ways include setting the agenda, determining the form of the discussion (e.g. its
length, the format of the messages), managing the information resources at the site, and so forth.
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A third difficulty concerns the problem of accessibility. This problem is par-
ticularly important in the context of North/South relationships. There is currently
a wide gap between Northern and Southern countries, both in terms of computer
and communication facilities and in terms of the educational background needed
to use these facilities. This electronic divide casts doubts on the suitability of the
electronic medium to act as a "host" for global political action. The various global
initiatives that have been set up recently to cope with this divide, such as the G8
"Digital Opportunity Task Force" or UNDP and Andersen Consulting's "oppor-
tunITy Initiative," are more a reflection of the depth of the problem than a sign of
its forthcoming resolution.
97
The practical difficulties associated with electronic democracy cast doubt on
the capacity of e-deliberation projects to produce legitimacy. But these difficul-
ties, as will be indicated below, reflect deeper theoretical difficulties.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF "LEGITIMACY": THE CREATIVE INSTITUTION
Beyond six rivers and three mountain ranges rises Zora, a city that no one,
having seen it, can forget. But not because, like other memorable cities, it leaves
an unusual image in your recollections. Zora has the quality of remaining in
your memory point by point, in its succession of streets, of houses along the
streets, and of doors and windows in the houses, though nothing in them pos-
sesses a special beauty or rarity. Zora's secret lies in the way your gaze runs over
patterns following one another as in a musical score where not a note can be al-
tered or displaced.... But in vain I set out to visit the city: forced to remain mo-
tionless and always the same, in order to be more easily remembered, Zora has
languished, disintegrated, disappeared. The earth has forgotten her .... 9
8
When he enters the territory of which Eutropia is the capital, the traveler
sees not one city but many, of equal size and not unlike one another, scattered
over a vast, rolling plateau. Eutropia is not one, but all these cities together; only
one is inhabited at a time, the others are empty; and this process is carried out in
97. For more information on these initiatives, see the website of the Digital Opportunity Task
Force, at http://www.dotforce.org. For a more detailed discussion of the electronic divide, see Jan
van Dijk, Widening Information Gaps and Policies of Prevention, in DIGITAL DEMOCRACY, supra note
88, at 166.
98. ITALO CALVINO, INVISIBLE CITIES 15-16 (William Weaver trans., 1972) (portraying Marco
Polo's reflection on his travels, as they were told by him to Kublai Khan, the great emperor of the
Tartars).
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rotation.... Thus the city repeats its life, identical, shifting up and down on its
empty chessboard. The inhabitants repeat the same scenes, with the actors
changed; they repeat the same speeches with variously combined accents; they
open alternate mouths in identical yawns. Alone, among all the cities of the em-
pire, Eutropia remains always the same. Mercury, god of the fickle, to whom the
city is sacred, worked this ambiguous miracle.99
A. From Direct Deliberation to Creativity
The vision of direct deliberation offers two competing interpretations of the
association between democracy and legitimacy. The first builds on the capacity
of collective reasoning to produce consensus. The second attributes the moral
power of the democratic process to the cultural standing of this process. More
specifically, the vision of direct deliberation stems from the existence of a widely
shared belief in the legitimacy of decisions that were made through a fair and
open dialogue. Both of these arguments are highly problematic, especially when
they are applied to the transnational context. The consensual interpretation of
the democratic ideal depends on a deep transcendental argument. This argu-
ment, which is probably best known in its Habermasian version, aspires to dem-
onstrate how the "reflexive possibilities of language prevent the disintegration of
structures of intersubjectivity." ° By recognizing the possibility of everyday
communication, Habermas argues, we necessarily presuppose the possibility of
an ideal speech situation, in which actors are motivated solely by the force of the
better argument. The possibility of consensual political dialogue is a direct con-
sequence of this transcendental interpretation of everyday communication.''
Habermas's political vision depends on this conceptualization of inter-sub-
jective communication. However, there are alternative, and not less convincing,
accounts of inter-subjective communication that do not follow Habermas's con-
sensual path. Under these accounts, disagreements, misunderstandings, and
99. Id. at 64-65.
100. Michael Power, Habermas and Transcendental Arguments: A Reappraisal, 23 PHIL. Soc. ScI.
26, 45 (1993).
101. For the most recent expositions of Habermas's political theory, see JORGEN HABERMAS, BE-
TWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (Wil-
liam Rehg trans., 1996); Jiirgen Habermas, Paradigms of Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 771 (1996). For
further discussion of Habermas's transcendental reasoning, see Michael Power, Habermas and the
Counterfactual Imagination, 17 CARDOZO L. REV.-1005, 1014 (1996).
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conflicts are equally probable results of communication; for these more skeptical
observers of the modern society, cross-cultural encounters are more likely to end
in "epistemic rupture" or "dialogical paralysis" than in some kind of consen-
sus. °2 Recent psychological studies provide additional support for this skeptical
view of collective deliberation. These studies indicate that the unique environ-
ment of group deliberation could significantly distort the way in which the de-
liberation process unfolds. °3
The cultural interpretation of the democratic experience is not less problem-
atic. The cultural hypothesis attributes the legitimizing force of democratic pro-
cedures to the cultural standing of the democratic ethos. This explanation
102. See, e.g., Niklas Luhmann, Quod Omnes Tangit: Remarks on Jirgen Habermas' Legal Theory,
17 CARDOZO L. REV. 883 (1996); Niklas Luhmann, What is Communication?, 2 COMM. THEORY 251
(1992); Gunther Teubner, De Collisione Discursuum: Communicative Rationalities in Law, Morality,
and Politics, 17 CARDOZo L. REV. 901 (1996). Earlier writers, such as David Hume, showed similar
skepticism toward the idea of "popular consent". Thus, Hume writes:
It is in vain to say that all governments are or should be at first founded on popular
consent, as much as the necessity of human affairs will admit.... I maintain that
human affairs will never admit of this consent, seldom of the appearance of it; but
that conquest or usurpation, that is, in plain terms, force, by dissolving the ancient
governments, is the origin of almost all the new ones which were ever established in
the world. And that in the few cases where consent may seem to have taken place, it
was commonly so irregular, so confined, or so much intermixed either with fraud or
violence that it cannot have any great authority.
DAVID HUME, OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT (1777), reprinted in HUME'S Moral and Political Philos-
ophy 356, 362 (Henry D. Aiken ed., 1948).
103. Thus, for example, in a recent paper, Schkade et al. study how jury deliberations depart
from the median or mean of the individual judgments of the jury members. Their results indicate
that the "jury-environment" tends to produce certain systemic distortions. For example, one
prominent effect was to move the group further in the direction suggested by its original ten-
dency: where the median of individual pre-deliberation judgments favored a high punishment
rating, deliberation typically increased the rating of the group, and where the median of individ-
ual pre-deliberation judgments favored a low punishment rating, deliberation typically decreased
the rating of the group. These results seem to indicate that there was something in the "group at-
mosphere," other than rational deliberation, that influenced the results of the deliberation process.
See David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139
(2000). A similar phenomenon was observed by studies of group deliberation over the Internet.
These studies found that e-deliberation, especially under conditions of anonymity, tends to mag-
nify the tendency of the group (and its members) to move toward a position that is more extreme
than its pre-deliberation position. This tendency has been described in psychological literature as
"group polarization." See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110
YALE L.J. 71, 101 (2000).
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grounds the force of the democratic narrative in some evolutionary process, rather
than rational negotiation, which led to the development of a culturally-shared be-
lief in the democratic ideal."° This evolutionary process is in no way deterministic
or universal. It is a highly contextual, path-dependent process, influenced and
shaped by the historical-geographical conditions of the societies in which it is em-
bedded." 5 The pluralistic nature of the transnational domain could thus be a
source of variable, and conflicting, accounts of "democracy" (e.g., what does the
requirement for a "fair and society-wide dialogue" actually mean?). 6 While it is
probably true that today, in the beginning of the twenty-first century, the demo-
cratic ideal is more popular than ever in human history," 7 there could be, and are,
highly conflicting views regarding the conditions for its realization.
The fragility of the cultural and metaphysical interpretations of the linkage
between democracy and legitimacy suggests that there is a need for an alternative
or supplemental justification for the attempt to democratize the norm-production
process at the transnational domain. This attempt should start with the recogni-
tion that a complete and consistent rationalization of the linkage between legiti-
macy and democracy is not attainable. This section develops such an alternative
narrative, which connects the attempts to design more "democratic" social struc-
tures with the notion of"creativity" or "creative institution." To see how this con-
cept could be used in our context, we need to examine its meaning more closely:
what does it mean to say about some person or institution that he or it is creative?
104. For a more detailed exploration of this evolutionary process, see, e.g., I KEN BINMORE,
GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: PLAYING FAIR (1994); 2 KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY
AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: JUST PLAYING (1994).
105. See generally, e.g., Paul A. David, Why Are Institutions the 'Carriers of History'?: Path Depen-
dence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions, 5 STRUCTURAL CHANGE &
ECON. DYNAMICS 205 (1994).
106. This interpretative diversity reflects, among other things, the difficulties associated with the
design of a fair deliberative process. The needs of governance demand that the process of deliber-
ation conclude with a binding decision-even if all attempts to reach a consensus have failed. The
challenge of designing a framework for deliberation, then, lies in the need to develop a "cutting"
mechanism of some sort which, despite its non-consensual nature, could preserve the fairness and
openness of the deliberation process. This is not an easy task. Consider the (realistic) possibility in
which the constitutional set-up of an international organization confers upon one of its organs the
(residual) power to conclude the deliberation process. How can we ensure that this residual power
is not abused, thus emptying the participatory process of any real meaning?
107. See, e.g., Keohane & Nye, supra note 14, at 9.
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The concept of creativity designates a distinction between creativity and
dullness (or uniformity). Its exploration can start, therefore, on either side. Con-
sider, first, the notion of dullness or evenness. In Invincible Cities, Italo Calvino
offers an imaginary documentation of Marco Polo's conversations with Kublai
Khan, the great emperor of the Tartars, in which Marco Polo reflects on his trav-
els in Khan's empire. 8 Zora and Eutropia were two of the many cities that
Marco Polo had visited. Their story sheds some light on the meaning of dullness.
Zora, Marco Polo tells the emperor, is "a city that no one, having seen it, can for-
get. But not because, like other memorable cities, it leaves an unusual image in
your recollections."'0 9 Zora's secret "lies in the way your gaze runs over patterns
following one another as in a musical score where not a note can be altered or
displaced."'1 ° Zora excels in its static existence. However, "forced to remain mo-
tionless and always the same, in order to be more easily remembered, Zora has
languished, disintegrated, disappeared. The earth has forgotten her.""'
The story of Zora suggests that dynamism is the key antidote for the risks of
dullness. Marco Polo's account of Eutropia, however, demonstrates that dullness
could be a feature of dynamic systems as well. Eutropia is "not one city but many,
of equal size and not unlike one another .... [O]nly one [of these] is inhabited at a
time, the others are empty; and this process is carried out in rotation.""' Eutropia's
inhabitants "repeat the same scenes, with the actors changed; they repeat the same
speeches with variously combined accents; they open alternate mouths in identical
yawns.''. The city repeats its life, therefore, in an endless circle, which always
ends in the same point. Eutropia's rules of transformation ensure that it will al-
ways remain the same. Its dynamism is illusive-it offers no real change.
But what does the other side of the distinction mean? I do not intend to give
a complete account of creativity (or, for that matter, of dullness) in this article."4
108. CALVINO,sUpra note 98, at 15-16.
109. Id. at 15.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 16.
112. Id. at 64.
113. Id. at 65.
114. For that discussion, see generally DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER, FLUID CONCEPTS & CREATIVE ANAL-
OGlES: COMPUTER MODELS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL MECHANISMS OF THOUGHT (1995) lhereinafter
FLUID CONCEPTS]; DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL THEMAS: QUESTING FOR THE ESSENCE OF
MIND AND PATTERN 526-46 (1985) [hereinafter METAMAGICAL THEMASI. In order to appreciate the
difficulties of defining "creativity" it might be useful to see how people who are regarded as
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Rather I wish to focus on two central aspects of creativity. The first is the posses-
sion of a flexible representational framework. The term "flexible representa-
tional framework" refers to the ability of an observer to perceive an event or
object simultaneously through several different perspectives that capture diverse
aspects of this event or object (e.g., its use, purpose, or context).115 In other words,
it refers to the capacity of an observing system to produce variable images of the
same event. The second has to do with the ability of a meaning system to break
out of loops of all sorts. That is, the capacity of a "thinking system" to observe it-
self, to identify different patterns in its activities, and to be able to cut short those
patterns which become repetitive, obsolete, or just uninteresting. 116
Creativity, then, refers to the ability not to be caught everlastingly in habit-
ual patterns. It indicates a capability for challenging established categories and
recasting them in new light."7 But what does it mean for a legal institution to be
highly creative have treated this idea. Consider, for example, Marc Chagall, one of the greatest
painters of the 20th century. In his biography, Chagall struggles in several places with the question
of creativity. My LIFE (Da Capo ed., 1994). The result is interesting because although it sheds some
light on Chagall's own creativity, it fails to provide us with a general definition of this notion. On
the day he tells his father that he wants to leave home and enter a school of art, he notes: "The es-
sential thing is art, painting, a painting different from the painting everyone does." Id. at 65. In an-
other place, Chagall speaks about the difficulties he had experienced in his first days at the School
of Art in Petersburg, which he attended in the beginning of his career. He notes: "The truth is, I'm
incapable of learning. Or rather it's impossible to teach me .... I get nothing except by instinct.
You understand? And academic theory has no hold on me." Id. at 91. Later, speaking of his life in
Paris, he tells the readers of his failed attempt to sell landscape pictures, a la Corot, at the market:
"I took a photograph, but the more I tried to paint like Corot, the farther I got from it and I ended
a la Chagall." Id. at 107. We have, in Chagall's narrative of creativity, a paradoxical blend of differ-
entiation, unruled instinct, and the idea of style. To some of these elements I return above.
115. See FLUID CoNCEPTs, supra note 114, at 175; see also David C. Marr, Artificial Intelligence: A
Personal View, 9 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 37,44 (1977).
116. See METAMAGICAL THEMAS, supra note 114, at 532-33; see also FLUID CONCERTs, supra note
114, at 313-14.
117. This aspect of creativity was captured powerfully by Henri Bergson in Introduction to Meta-
physics, in HENRI BERGSON, THE CREATIVE MIND 224 (1946). For him, the challenge of coping with
a mobile and ceaselessly changing reality requires the mind to adopt a "creative" or "intuitive"
mode; that is, it
must do itself violence, reverse the direction of the operation by which it ordinarily
thinks, continually upsetting its categories, or rather, recasting them. In so doing it
will arrive at fluid concepts, capable of following reality in all its windings and of
adopting the very movement of the inner life of things.
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creative, and how does it relate to the quest for legitimacy? Legal creativity re-
fers, first, to the capacity of the law to produce varied images of the same event,
that is, to the flexibility of its cognitive apparatus." But, more importantly, it re-
fers to the rules of transformation, which govern the process of normative
change. Dynamism, as Eutropia has taught us, should not be considered as a syn-
onym for creativity. To be creative, the rules of transformation must enable the
law to reinvent itself in a non-repetitive way."9 The law must be able continu-
ously to challenge its traditional analogies, to consider them as imperfect ratios
or relations. One of the virtues of creative transformation is that it defies domi-
nation and exclusion. While it cannot guarantee that one's voice will be heard,
much less accepted, it can ensure that the law is not dominated by a single voice.
The appeal of the notion of "creative normativity" does not depend, therefore,
on particular cultural premises, or on the promise of inter-subjective rationality,
but on the capacity of creative institutions to challenge habitual social structures.
In a world that cherishes diversity of thought and forms of life, this competency
(or virtue) could play an important role. 2 ° Consistency, then, is not necessarily a
positive virtue.2
118. This interpretation of "creativity" is, to some extent, at odds with the scientific project. If the
scientific project is interpreted as a search for a single way in which to express scientific data-for
example, the smallest algorithm capable of generating (and extending) a particular series of obser-
vations-it is definitely inconsistent with the quest for institutional structures that would, by their
very nature, be capable of generating multiple descriptions of reality. See generally Gregory J.
Chaitin, Randomness and Mathematical Proof, 232 Sc. AM. 47 (1975); Ray Solomonoff, Does Algo-
rithmic Probability Solve the Problem of Induction?, Oxbridge Res. Rep. 97-1 (1997), available at
http://world.std.com/- rjs/isis96.html.
119. For an account of creativity in law, see, e.g., Niklas Luhmann, The Third Question: The Cre-
ative Use of Paradoxes in Law and Legal History, 15 J. L. & Soc'y 153 (1988).
120. See, e.g., CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM AND "THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION" (1992);
Lawrence Blum, Recognition, Value, And Equality: A Critique of Charles Taylor's and Nancy Fraser's
Accounts ofMulticulturalism, 5 CONSTELLATIONS 51 (1998) (indicating that cultural distinctiveness
is necessary to create a sense of individual value).
121. Robert Howse has considered the question of the legitimacy of the WTO adjudicative sys-
tem. See Howse, supra note 44. He argues that the values of coherence and consistency are an im-
portant source of legitimacy for any adjudicative system. Id. at 60. This argument, as was
suggested above, is highly problematic. To the extent that certain rules are perceived as fair or le-
gitimate in and by themselves, their consistent application might be socially valuable. Consistent or
coherent application, however, in itself says nothing about the legitimacy of the applied rules. In-
deed, the GATT and WTO were highly consistent in their rejection of Article XX claims over the
years, id. at 46-47, 68, which did not stop these rulings from being highly controversial.
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However, legal creativity has its own costs.' Social actors in various fields,
from business to politics to sports, rely on the normative framework in force, and
plan their actions accordingly. In a creative legal system such reliance could
never be absolute. Normative uncertainty could (although not necessarily) im-
pose economic or mental costs on those who rely on the law. The transition to a
new normative regime could also impose various adjustment costs (reflecting,
for example, learning efforts or any planned or unplanned effects). These con-
siderations are not without weight, but they do not form a convincing argument
for conservatism. As Italo Calvino's story of Zora indicates, the apparent "effi-
ciency" of legal conservatism could be illusory. Conservatism and dullness carry
other risks: the risks of degeneration, decay, and disintegration. In a world that
increasingly loses its faith in the existence of true descriptions (of the world, of
morality), it seems that some expectation shift is inevitable. Niklas Luhmann,
the prominent German sociologist, has encapsulated this point insightfully:
"What would be important then would be not a potential for security but rather
a potential for insecurity. And not dependence but rather freedom: the place of
capriciousness that cannot find a home: imagination."' 23
Attributing the virtue of creativity to institutions assumes, of course, that
there is a sensible way by which institutions and humans could be distin-
guished-that institutions are not just aggregates of human agents.'24 This dis-
tinction means, among other things, that the capacity of human beings for
122. See generally Michael P van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2002)
(exploring the cost to a legal system of adjusting to new laws).
123. NIKLAS LUHMANN, OBSERVATIONS ON MODERNITY 43 (1998).
124. The concept of "creative institution" requires us, then, to make a clear distinction between
the institution-the legal system in our context-and the human (professional or other) commu-
nity that takes part in its operation. Law, as an institution, is understood here as a self-reproduc-
ing, recursive network of communications, which is ordered by a unique structure based
primarily on the distinction between legal and illegal. The emergence of law as a unique cultural
phenomenon occurs, then, not on the basis of some organizational or professional complex, but
rather through the development of unique communicative patterns. This communicative vision
departs from other models of law, in which the legal system is described as either "an ordered set
of propositions or an organizational system." Niklas Luhmann, The Coding of the Legal System, in
STATE, LAW AND ECONOMY AS SYSTEMS: REGULATION AND AUTONOMY IN A NEW PERSPECTIVE 145,
153 (A. Febbrajo & Gunther Teubner eds., 1992). Legal actors are not seen, therefore, as part of the
legal system, but, rather, as conditions in the environment, which might indeed be indispensable
to the operation of the law, but are not constitutive of it. See generally Niklas Luhmann, Opera-
tional Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation of the Legal System, 13 CARDOZO L. REV.
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creative thought and behavior does not guarantee the creativity of the social in-
stitutions in which their actions are embedded. The reality is quite different: it is
not only that the creativity of human beings cannot be attributed automatically
to the institutions in which they operate, but that institutional structures actually
pose a continuous threat to this fragile human virtue. 2 ' The capacity of institu-
tions to suppress and overpower human creativity provides further motivation
for the development of organizational mechanisms that can support creativity.
1419 (1992). This vision of the law as a social system distinguishes sharply between the social and
psychic realms. Human individuals reappear in the social world of communication, only
as communicative constructions, as semantic artifacts, that have no correspondence
to consciousness, to the autopoietic processes in the psychic world. Psychic and so-
cial processes do co-exist; they are 'coupled' by synchronization and coevolution, but
there is no overlap in their operations. There is nothing but a symmetry of reality
constructions: psychic processes produce mental constructs of society, and social
processes produce communicative constructs of the psyche.
Gunther Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law, 23 L. &
Soc'y REV. 727, 737 (1989).
125. The Holocaust is probably the most terrible manifestation of this threat. Jean Am&y pro-
vides a disturbing description of how creativity or intellect can be destroyed by institutions. JEAN
AMIIRY, AT THE MIND'S LIMITS: CONTEMPLATIONS BY A SURVIVOR ON AUSCHWITZ AND ITS REALITIES
(Sidney Rosenfeld & Stella P. Rosenfeld trans., 1980). Am6ry argues that to flourish, human intel-
lect needs asocialfunction. This social function was absent, Am~ry argues, in most of the concen-
tration camps. In Auschwitz, he writes:
the intellect was nothing more than itselfand there was no chance to apply it to a so-
cial structure, no matter how insufficient, no matter how concealed it may have
been. Thus the intellectual was alone with his intellect, which was nothing other
than pure content of consciousness, and there was no social reality that could sup-
port and confirm it.
Id. at 6. In Auschwitz,
everything intellectual gradually took on a doubly new form: on the one hand, psy-
chologically, it became something completely unreal, and on the other hand, to the
extent that one defines it in social terms, a kind of forbidden luxury. Sometimes one
experienced these new facts at deeper levels than those one can reach during a
bunk-bed conversation; then the intellect very abruptly lost its basic quality: its tran-
scendence.
Id. at 7. The dreadful social reality that was constructed by the Nazis gave no room for intellectual
creativity. For further discussions of the fragility of human creativity, see FRANCISCO J. VARELA,
ETHICAL KNOW-How: ACTION, WISDOM AND COGNITION (1999); METAMAGICAL THEMAS,
supra note 114, at 526-46.
OREN PEREZ
The notion of creativity can thus be used as a basis for both justifying and crit-
icizing transnational legal institutions. The argument, however, with respect to
institutional creativity should not be understood as part of an attempt to compose
a comprehensive virtue ethics for institutions. Virtue ethics, in the tradition of Ar-
istotle, seeks to compile a list of traits that combined determine an ideal, virtuous
moral type.'26 This notion of virtue forms an integral part of the understanding of
morality, and a point of departure for the evaluation of behavior.'27 My argument,
in contrast, postulates the linkage between legitimacy and creativity as contingent
and indefinite. The ethical or political value of creativity is contingent and re-
mains a matter of point of view. One such point of view, pluralism, and its possible
consequences, was discussed above. I do not claim, however, that this point of view
has a privileged or comprehensive moral status. In that sense, creativity does not
offer absolute justification for institutional authority.
B. Potential Applications
The idea of institutional creativity is not just an abstract construct. It could
be used as an admittedly rough yardstick for evaluating the legitimacy of legal
structures. Two examples could clarify my argument. To a large extent, the at-
tempts to democratize the process of transnational norm production could be re-
interpreted as an effort to ensure the creativity oftransnational law. Consider for
example the issue of NGO participation. I argued above that the idea of NGO-
126. See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (C. J. Rowe & Sarah Broadie trans., 2002);
Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1431 (2000). The most influential attempt to construct a theory of law in the Aristo-
telian tradition is LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1969). As explained in the text, however, I
do not follow Fuller's path.
127. As Feldman notes:
One novel feature of the virtue ethics approach is that, while it relies on character
traits as a way of appraising conduct, it does not appraise actions according to the ac-
tual subjective motives or character traits of the actor. In other words, virtue ethics
does not think acts inherit their moral worth from the motive of the actor. Instead,
virtue ethics identifies particular traits as more or less worthy, asks what sort of acts
these traits dispose a person to perform, and then rates acts according to whether or
not they are of the kind a person possessed of worthy character traits would per-
form.
Feldman, supra note 126, at 1432.
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led democratization is problematic primarily because NGOs, by their very na-
ture, suffer from the same democratic flaws that characterize the transnational
organizations (e.g., the WTO) that they claim to democratize. It is not clear,
then, why incorporating NGOs into the decisionmaking apparatus of those or-
ganizations should make them more democratic (and hence legitimate).
However, looking at this argument from the perspective of creativity en-
dows it with a different meaning. The point of the NGO-participation argu-
ment is not to augment the WTO democratic profile, but, rather, to build up its
creativity by exposing it to a variety of cognitive and normative standpoints. The
procedural rules that govern the participation of NGOs in the work of the
WTO should be designed, then, with this goal in mind. Any participation
scheme should include two key elements. First, the scheme would have to en-
sure that the right of participation would be allocated to NGOs with sufficiently
different political or philosophical agendas. From the perspective of creativity,
there should not be an a-priori requirement to open the norm-production pro-
cess to any interested party. Second, the law would have to guarantee that the
NGOs' arguments would receive "fair" hearing, though how to achieve this re-
mains a difficult problem. 2 '
The recent discussion of the precautionary principle within the WTO pro-
vides another example of the possible role of creativity as a source of legitimacy.
The precautionary principle is one of the greatest puzzles of contemporary in-
ternational environmental law. Despite the fact that this principle is used exten-
sively in legal communication, its meaning remains highly disputed.'29 This
vagueness has made the problem ofoperationalizing the precautionary principle
128. One way to ensure the goal of "fair hearing" is to require the legal tribunal to give detailed
reasons for rejecting any NGO's argument. In the context of the WTO, such obligation could be
anchored in the Panel's duty under Article II of the DSU to "make an objective assessment of the
matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of
and conformity with the relevant covered agreements .. " DSU, supra note 47, art. 11. The Ap-
pellate Body used this part of Article 11 in its Shrimp decision to justify its interpretation of the
panel's wide authority to accept information from third parties. See Shrimp Report,supra note 7,
106. The notion of "creativity" was not mentioned, however, by the Appellate Body.
129. See Kenneth R. Foster et al., Science and the Precautionary Principle, 288 SCIENCE 979 (2000),
available at http://www.biotech-info.net/science-and PPhtml; see also Commission for the Euro-
pean Communities, Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle,
COM(2000) 1, Feb. 2000, available at europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/healthconsumer/ library/pub/
pub07_en.pdf; Hormones Case, supra note 7. The Appellate Body rejected the attempt of the Euro-
pean Union to justify its ban on hormone-treated beef by reference to the precautionary principle.
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both difficult and pressing. The WTO Appellate Body had to confront this
problem in a recent dispute between Japan and the United States. 3 ° The dispute
was triggered by the imposition of certain quarantine requirements by the Japa-
nese authorities on the import of agricultural products from the United States.
The Panel found that these restrictions were maintained without sufficient sci-
entific evidence in the sense of Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.'3 The Panel's
conclusions were upheld by the Appellate Body, which recommended that
Japan change its regulatory scheme and bring it into conformity with the SPS
Agreement. 3 2 Japan tried to justify its regulatory scheme by invoking Article 5.7
of the SPS Agreement, which is the SPS version of the precautionary principle.
This Article reads as follows:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Mem-
ber may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures
on the basis of available pertinent information, including that
from the relevant international organizations as well as from san-
itary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In
such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and
review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within
a reasonable period of time.1
While the Appellate Body did not object, in principle, to the suggestion that it should take account
of general principles of international environmental law, it noted that the legal status of the precau-
tionary principle is still an open question, and that the appeal was not the proper place to resolve it.
Id. 9 123.
130. Appellate Body Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/AB/R,
Feb. 22, 1999, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e1542d.pdf [hereinafter,
Japan AB Report].
131. Panel Decision, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/R, Oct. 27,
1998, 8.43, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispue/76r.pdf. The Panel found
that the United States had raised a presumption that Japan's regulatory requirement was main-
tained without sufficient scientific evidence and that this presumption has not been sufficiently re-
butted by Japan. Id. 9 8.42. The subject of the dispute was a "varietal testing requirement" that
required, as a condition for an import license, a separate testing for each variety of any agricultural
product that was subject to a general quarantine treatment requirement. The varietal require-
ment was applied even if the quarantine treatment was found to be effective with respect to other
varieties of the same product. The Japanese measure created substantial difficulties for U.S. farm-
ers (e.g., in the apples, cherries and walnuts sectors). See id. 4.20, tbl. 2.
132. Japan AB Report,supra note 130, 9 84-85, 143-44.
133. SPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 5.7.
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In its discussion of Japan's arguments, the Appellate Body focused on the
procedural requirements of the second sentence of Article 5.7.134 Article 5.7 's sec-
ond sentence establishes simple procedural requirements, under which a Mem-
ber State may not maintain a provisional or precautionary sanitary or
phytosanitary measure unless it: (1) "seek[s] to obtain the additional information
necessary for a more objective assessment of risk;" and (2) "review[s] the ... mea-
sure accordingly within a reasonable period of time."'
35
These two requirements can be seen as setting the basis for creative or re-
flexive regulation. They seek to create an environment of "constant reflection,"
which will discourage normative rigidity.' 36 In rejecting the Japanese attempt to
rely on the precautionary principle, the Appellate Body pointed to the fact that
Japan has failed to meet both of these procedural requirements.'37 In judging the
regulatory regimes of its Members, the WTO legal system looks, then, not just
to the normative content of these regimes, but also to the capacity of these regu-
latory regimes to generate "normative creativity."
134. Japan AB Report, supra note 130, 9 11-14. In this way, the Appellate Body sought to cir-
cumvent the more difficult question of the meaning of the two somewhat inconsistent require-
ments of Article 5.7. The first sentence of Article 5.7 refers, on the one hand, to the scarcity of the
current "scientific evidence," and on the other hand, requires that the sanitary measures be based,
nonetheless, on "available pertinent information." Reconciling these dual requirements is not an
easy task. This problematic tension is inherent in implementation of the precautionary principle.
Since complete scientific certainty is the exception, rather than the norm, it is not clear how using
the "precautionary principle" should actually change the nature of regulatory decisionmaking.
See U.S. Mission to the European Union, U.S. Government Submission to the Committee on
General Principles of the Codex Alimentarius Commission for the Committee's Apr. 10-14, 2000
Meeting: Working Principles for Risk Analysis, Mar. 22, 2000, para. 5, at http://www.useu.be/is-
sues/ confdoc0322.html.
135. SPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 5.7.
136. Normative rigidity is one of the indications of protectionist intent.
137. Japan AB Report, supra note 130, 92-93. The Panel noted, in that context, that the vari-
etal testing requirement had been in place since 1969, and was first applied to the relevant U.S.
products in 1979. Japan had, therefore, almost 30 years within which it could have gathered data
on the scientific justification of the varietal testing requirement. Id. 8.57. This fact was impor-
tant even though the obligation "to review" the SPS measure has only been in existence since Jan-
uary 1, 1995. The Appellate Body noted, further, that since Japan's varietal testing requirement
failed to meet the requirements of the second sentence of Article 5.7, there was no need to examine
whether it failed to meet the requirements of the first sentence of Article 5.7. Id. 91.
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CONCLUSION
The concept of "creative institution" does not claim to offer a complete ac-
count of legitimacy. Rather, it constitutes an additional perspective for viewing
and articulating the idea of legitimate governance. Thus, for example, the calls for
deeper involvement of NGOs in the judicial processes within the WTO, and the
attempts to develop new, electronically oriented modes of participation can be
seen as attempts to design more creative legal structures. Similarly, the Appellate
Body's interpretation of the precautionary principle seems to ground the legiti-
macy of risk regimes in the reflexivity of the underlying regulatory structure. The
legitimizing power of these procedural mechanisms depends, ultimately, on their
capacity to challenge the habitual patterns of the domains in which they operate.
Creativity, however, is not a synonym for legitimacy. These two terms are
not linked together in an inevitable path of logical necessity. The social appeal of
the idea of creativity lies in the way in which it defies domination and exclusion.
To the extent that this defiance is valued by society, the notion of creativity could
be used as a ground for both justifying and criticizing transnational legal insti-
tutions. Creativity, however, even when it exists, cannot serve as an absolute jus-
tification for authority. Using it should, however, enrich the discourse of
legitimacy. In that sense, the notion of creativity constitutes one of the pieces of
which the (vague, composite) notion of legitimacy is comprised.
